Files
pangolin/infra/terraform/README.md
T
wangjia 3d5bac66b4 feat(provision): 弹性节点基建 Terraform + 一键更换 (tsk_6u0FxmbC7Yeq)
IaC 面 (infra/) 与控制面 (server/internal/provision) 双产出,落地 doc/04 §4
「节点是牲口」弹性拓扑与 make-before-break 一键更换。

server/internal/provision:
- CloudAdapter 适配层 + Registry(首发 vultr 消耗品池 / hetzner 精品池各一);
  厂商凭证仅从 PROVISION_<VENDOR>_* env 注入,不入库不入 git。
- ProvisionService:CreateNode(幂等键重放不重复开机)、DestroyNode(幂等)、
  RotateIP(换 IP 不换机 + version bump)、ListProviders。
- Replace 一键更换:先建后拆,新机 up 先于旧机 draining(容量不下降),
  replacement_uuid 幂等键 + replacements 表分步记录,崩溃可续跑不重复。
- RotatePool:池内滚动轮换,并发度 1–2。
- cmd/nodectl CLI:create/destroy/rotate-ip/replace/rotate-pool/providers。
- 单测(mock 厂商 API + 内存 Store):幂等重放、make-before-break 时序断言、
  开机失败/探活超时→destroyed+失败计数+告警钩子、崩溃续跑、RotatePool。

infra/:
- terraform/:探针机 + 控制面基线模块化(probe / control-plane)+ README,
  低频基线进 state,节点不进 Terraform。
- cloud-init/node.yaml.tmpl:节点引导模板(注入一次性 bootstrap token,task #5)。
- identity-isolation.md:身份隔离登记表(doc/06 §2 红线,无任何凭证)。

migrations/000008:nodes 增 provider_instance_id/elastic_ip_id、node_events
增 ip_rotated、provision_idempotency / replacements 表(附加式,不动现网)。

红线:仅面向新厂商池,绝不纳管现网生产 EC2(deploy/ marzban)。

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-13 14:23:39 +08:00

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2.5 KiB
Markdown

# `infra/terraform` — baseline infrastructure as code
Terraform here manages **only low-frequency baseline resources**:
- **probe machines** — overseas reference dial-test points (doc/04 §1, §4.2).
- **control-plane environment** — the API + MySQL + Redis host (doc/04 §5.2),
off by default because it changes rarely.
## What is deliberately NOT here
**Data-plane nodes are not in Terraform.** They are disposable cattle, created
and destroyed minute-by-minute through vendor APIs by the provision service
(`server/internal/provision`, doc/04 §4). Putting them in Terraform state would
fight the "nodes are cattle, not pets" model and serialise every open/退机
behind a state lock. Division of labour:
| concern | owner | frequency | in TF state |
|---------|-------|-----------|-------------|
| probe machines | Terraform (this dir) | low | ✅ |
| control-plane env | Terraform (this dir) | one-off | ✅ |
| data-plane nodes (entry/relay/exit) | provision service + vendor API | minutes | ❌ |
## Identity isolation (RED LINE, doc/06 §2)
Every vendor/account/domain used here MUST be an **independent identity** — its
own account, email, and crypto payment, with **zero cross-linkage** to other
assets. This Terraform code and the data-plane vendor accounts use **separate**
credentials:
- `var.hcloud_token` here is the **management/probe** account token — *not* a
data-plane vendor token.
- Data-plane vendor credentials live only in `PROVISION_<VENDOR>_*` env secrets
consumed by the provision service, never in Terraform, never in the DB.
The full isolation register (which account/email/payment maps to which asset) is
maintained in [`../identity-isolation.md`](../identity-isolation.md).
## Usage
```bash
cd infra/terraform
cp terraform.tfvars.example terraform.tfvars # gitignored; fill in
export TF_VAR_hcloud_token=... # inject secret, never commit
terraform init
terraform fmt -check
terraform validate
terraform plan
terraform apply
```
CI/management operations run on a **dedicated channel** (doc/06 §2), not from an
operator's everyday machine.
## Layout
```
terraform/
versions.tf provider + backend pins
variables.tf root inputs
main.tf wires probe[] + control-plane modules
outputs.tf probe IPs, control-plane IP
terraform.tfvars.example
modules/
probe/ one overseas reference probe point
control-plane/ API+MySQL+Redis host (prevent_destroy)
```