Files
pangolin/server/internal/auth/service.go
T
wangjia a5e25b444f feat(auth): 验证码/注册/登录/JWT 鉴权模块 (tsk_2PFfyviECIXh)
实现 server/internal/auth 控制面鉴权底座,对应 doc/02 §4.1、doc/06 §3:

- POST /v1/auth/code:IP+邮箱双维度 Redis 滑窗限频(同邮箱 1/min、同 IP 10/h)
  + 一次性邮箱域黑名单(embed 词表)→ 6 位数字码写 auth:code:{email} TTL 10min
  → 异步发信(SMTP / 开发态 log mailer)。
- POST /v1/auth/register:验码(一次性,删 key;超次数烧码)→ 单事务建号
  (uuid + dp_uuid 应用层生成、argon2id)+ 7 天 PRO 试用(source='trial')→ 签发 JWT。
- POST /v1/auth/login:argon2id 校验(失败恒定时、未知用户走 dummy hash);
  失败计数限流 rl:login:{email} + 锁定;banned 拒绝。
- POST /v1/auth/refresh:RS256,access 15min + refresh 30d 落 Redis 白名单
  jwt:refresh:{jti},旋转时删旧写新;JWT 头带 kid,验证端接受新旧公钥支持轮换。
- RequireAuth 中间件:解析 Bearer access,注入 user id(复用 codes.CtxKeyUserID
  避免循环依赖)+ uuid + claims 到 context。
- 错误体统一走 internal/apierr 的 {code, message_zh, message_en},文案双语脱敏。
- 文件拆分:handler/service/password/token/ratelimit/emailcheck/store/mailer/
  middleware/errors/keyloader;config 增加可选 JWT PEM 路径/kid 加载。

测试:password/token/ratelimit/emailcheck/service/handler/middleware 单测
(miniredis,含注册全流程、重复邮箱 409、验证码错误/过期/复用/烧码、限频 429
带 Retry-After、登录失败锁定、banned 拒绝、refresh 旋转后旧 token 失效),
go test -race 通过;集成测试 integration_test.go(testcontainers MySQL8+Redis,
register→login→refresh→受保护接口全链路,构建 tag integration)与 codes 模块同构。

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-13 12:19:10 +08:00

293 lines
8.4 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/subtle"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"time"
"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
"github.com/wangjia/pangolin/server/internal/apierr"
)
// Redis key helpers for verification codes (doc/03 §4: auth:code:{email}).
func codeKey(email string) string { return "auth:code:" + email }
func codeAttemptsKey(email string) string { return "auth:code:attempts:" + email }
// Rate-limit scopes.
const (
scopeCodeEmail = "code:email" // per-email send limit
scopeCodeIP = "code:ip" // per-IP send limit
scopeLogin = "login" // per-email login-failure counter
)
// ServiceConfig tunes the auth service. Zero values fall back to the documented
// defaults (doc/02 §4.1, doc/06 §3).
type ServiceConfig struct {
CodeTTL time.Duration // verification code lifetime (default 10m)
CodeMaxAttempts int // max verify attempts before code is burned (default 5)
TrialDays int // auto PRO trial length (default 7)
EmailPerMinute int // code sends per email per minute (default 1)
IPPerHour int // code sends per IP per hour (default 10)
LoginFailMax int // failed logins before lock (default 5)
LoginLockWindow time.Duration // lock / failure-window length (default 15m)
}
func (c *ServiceConfig) withDefaults() {
if c.CodeTTL <= 0 {
c.CodeTTL = 10 * time.Minute
}
if c.CodeMaxAttempts <= 0 {
c.CodeMaxAttempts = 5
}
if c.TrialDays <= 0 {
c.TrialDays = 7
}
if c.EmailPerMinute <= 0 {
c.EmailPerMinute = 1
}
if c.IPPerHour <= 0 {
c.IPPerHour = 10
}
if c.LoginFailMax <= 0 {
c.LoginFailMax = 5
}
if c.LoginLockWindow <= 0 {
c.LoginLockWindow = 15 * time.Minute
}
}
// Service is the auth business layer: code issuance, registration, login, and
// token refresh. It is safe for concurrent use.
type Service struct {
store UserStore
rdb *redis.Client
rl *RateLimiter
tokens *TokenManager
mailer Mailer
cfg ServiceConfig
now func() time.Time
}
// NewService wires the auth service. now may be nil (defaults to time.Now).
func NewService(store UserStore, rdb *redis.Client, rl *RateLimiter, tokens *TokenManager, mailer Mailer, cfg ServiceConfig, now func() time.Time) *Service {
cfg.withDefaults()
if now == nil {
now = time.Now
}
return &Service{
store: store,
rdb: rdb,
rl: rl,
tokens: tokens,
mailer: mailer,
cfg: cfg,
now: now,
}
}
// SendCode applies rate-limiting and disposable-domain checks, generates a
// 6-digit code, stores it in Redis (TTL CodeTTL), and dispatches it
// asynchronously. retryAfter is non-zero only when a rate limit was hit.
func (s *Service) SendCode(ctx context.Context, rawEmail, ip string) (retryAfter time.Duration, apiErr *apierr.Error) {
email := NormalizeEmail(rawEmail)
if !ValidEmail(email) {
return 0, ErrInvalidRequest
}
if IsDisposable(email) {
return 0, ErrEmailDisposable
}
// Per-email limit: 1/min by default.
ok, ra, err := s.rl.Allow(ctx, scopeCodeEmail, email, s.cfg.EmailPerMinute, time.Minute)
if err != nil {
return 0, ErrInternal
}
if !ok {
return ra, ErrRateLimited
}
// Per-IP limit: e.g. 10/h. Skipped when IP is unknown.
if ip != "" {
ok, ra, err = s.rl.Allow(ctx, scopeCodeIP, ip, s.cfg.IPPerHour, time.Hour)
if err != nil {
return 0, ErrInternal
}
if !ok {
return ra, ErrRateLimited
}
}
code, err := genNumericCode(6)
if err != nil {
return 0, ErrInternal
}
pipe := s.rdb.Pipeline()
pipe.Set(ctx, codeKey(email), code, s.cfg.CodeTTL)
pipe.Del(ctx, codeAttemptsKey(email)) // reset attempt counter for the new code
if _, err := pipe.Exec(ctx); err != nil {
return 0, ErrInternal
}
// Dispatch asynchronously; the request must not block on SMTP. A detached
// context is used so request cancellation doesn't abort delivery.
go func(to, c string) {
sendCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_ = s.mailer.SendCode(sendCtx, to, c)
}(email, code)
return 0, nil
}
// Register verifies the code (one-time), creates the account plus a 7-day PRO
// trial in a single transaction, and returns a fresh token pair.
func (s *Service) Register(ctx context.Context, rawEmail, code, password string) (*TokenPair, *apierr.Error) {
email := NormalizeEmail(rawEmail)
if !ValidEmail(email) || len(password) < 8 || len(code) != 6 {
return nil, ErrInvalidRequest
}
// Verify the code with brute-force protection.
if apiErr := s.verifyCode(ctx, email, code); apiErr != nil {
return nil, apiErr
}
pwHash, err := HashPassword(password)
if err != nil {
return nil, ErrInternal
}
user, err := s.store.CreateUserWithTrial(ctx, email, pwHash, s.cfg.TrialDays)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, ErrEmailTaken) {
return nil, ErrEmailExists
}
return nil, ErrInternal
}
pair, err := s.tokens.Issue(ctx, user.ID, user.UUID)
if err != nil {
return nil, ErrInternal
}
return pair, nil
}
// verifyCode checks the supplied code against Redis. The code is consumed
// (deleted) on success, and after CodeMaxAttempts failed tries it is burned to
// stop brute forcing the 6-digit space. All failure modes return ErrCodeInvalid
// to avoid distinguishing wrong / expired / used.
func (s *Service) verifyCode(ctx context.Context, email, code string) *apierr.Error {
stored, err := s.rdb.Get(ctx, codeKey(email)).Result()
if err == redis.Nil {
return ErrCodeInvalid
}
if err != nil {
return ErrInternal
}
// Count this attempt (TTL bounded by the code lifetime).
attempts, err := s.rdb.Incr(ctx, codeAttemptsKey(email)).Result()
if err != nil {
return ErrInternal
}
if attempts == 1 {
_ = s.rdb.Expire(ctx, codeAttemptsKey(email), s.cfg.CodeTTL).Err()
}
if attempts > int64(s.cfg.CodeMaxAttempts) {
// Burn the code and the counter.
_ = s.rdb.Del(ctx, codeKey(email), codeAttemptsKey(email)).Err()
return ErrCodeInvalid
}
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(stored), []byte(code)) != 1 {
return ErrCodeInvalid
}
// Success: consume the code (one-time use).
_ = s.rdb.Del(ctx, codeKey(email), codeAttemptsKey(email)).Err()
return nil
}
// Login authenticates email+password with constant-time behaviour and a
// failure-count lock. retryAfter is non-zero only when the account is locked.
func (s *Service) Login(ctx context.Context, rawEmail, password, ip string) (*TokenPair, time.Duration, *apierr.Error) {
_ = ip // IP reserved for future per-IP login throttling; not logged.
email := NormalizeEmail(rawEmail)
if email == "" || password == "" {
return nil, 0, ErrInvalidRequest
}
// Lock check.
count, ttl, err := s.rl.FailureCount(ctx, scopeLogin, email)
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, ErrInternal
}
if count >= int64(s.cfg.LoginFailMax) && ttl > 0 {
return nil, ttl, ErrAccountLocked
}
user, err := s.store.GetUserByEmail(ctx, email)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
// Spend equivalent CPU so timing doesn't reveal account existence.
ConstantTimeReject(password)
_, _ = s.rl.RecordFailure(ctx, scopeLogin, email, s.cfg.LoginLockWindow)
return nil, 0, ErrInvalidCredentials
}
return nil, 0, ErrInternal
}
valid, verr := VerifyPassword(user.PwHash, password)
if verr != nil || !valid {
_, _ = s.rl.RecordFailure(ctx, scopeLogin, email, s.cfg.LoginLockWindow)
return nil, 0, ErrInvalidCredentials
}
if user.Status == "banned" {
return nil, 0, ErrAccountBanned
}
// Success: clear the failure counter and issue tokens.
_ = s.rl.ClearFailures(ctx, scopeLogin, email)
pair, err := s.tokens.Issue(ctx, user.ID, user.UUID)
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, ErrInternal
}
return pair, 0, nil
}
// Refresh validates and rotates a refresh token.
func (s *Service) Refresh(ctx context.Context, refreshToken string) (*TokenPair, *apierr.Error) {
if refreshToken == "" {
return nil, ErrInvalidRequest
}
pair, err := s.tokens.Refresh(ctx, refreshToken)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidTokenSentinel) {
return nil, ErrInvalidToken
}
// Parse / signature / expiry failures all map to an opaque invalid-token.
return nil, ErrInvalidToken
}
return pair, nil
}
// genNumericCode returns an n-digit numeric string drawn from crypto/rand.
func genNumericCode(n int) (string, error) {
const digits = "0123456789"
b := make([]byte, n)
for i := range b {
idx, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(int64(len(digits))))
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("auth: gen code: %w", err)
}
b[i] = digits[idx.Int64()]
}
return string(b), nil
}