Files
pangolin/server/internal/auth/token.go
T
wangjia 2f298f0a0a
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feat(devices): P2 sessions 表 + 在线/最后登录/客户端版本
migration 000016(mysql+sqlite,含 down):新增 sessions 表(绑 device+refresh JTI)
+ devices 加 client_version/totp_trusted_until。devices 唯一键改 + platform CHECK
加 linux(需 SQLite 表重建)拆出后续迁移,降风险。

后端:新 internal/sessions Store(Create/Rotate/Revoke/RevokeByDevice/
LastLoginByDevice);TokenManager 外露 refresh JTI(IssueWithJTI/RefreshWithJTI/
ParseRefreshJTI);auth.Service 注入 SessionStore——登录建会话、刷新轮换、登出吊销;
DeviceRegistrar 返回 deviceID;ReportUsage 心跳 touch devices.last_seen(在线判定);
devices.ListDevices 经 LastLoginSource 注入返回 online(last_seen<3min)/client_version/
last_login;RegisterIfAbsent 存 client_version。
客户端:Device model 加 online/clientVersion/lastLogin(fromJson 自动解析)。
测试:sessions store 3 例 + ListDevices 在线/最后登录 + device model 2 例 +
migration v16;全量 go test/flutter test 绿。

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-29 00:50:24 +08:00

328 lines
10 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"context"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
)
// Token type discriminator carried in the `typ` claim so an access token can
// never be replayed as a refresh token and vice-versa.
const (
typAccess = "access"
typRefresh = "refresh"
)
// Default lifetimes (doc/02 §4.1): access 15 min, refresh 30 days.
const (
DefaultAccessTTL = 15 * time.Minute
DefaultRefreshTTL = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
)
// refreshKeyPrefix is the Redis whitelist prefix for refresh-token JTIs.
const refreshKeyPrefix = "jwt:refresh:"
// Claims is the JWT payload. Subject holds the user UUID; UID carries the
// numeric primary key so downstream middleware/stores avoid a DB round-trip.
type Claims struct {
jwt.RegisteredClaims
UID int64 `json:"uid"`
Typ string `json:"typ"`
}
// TokenPair is the issued access/refresh pair plus the access lifetime seconds.
type TokenPair struct {
AccessToken string
RefreshToken string
ExpiresIn int // access_token validity in seconds
}
// TokenManager signs tokens with one RSA private key (identified by kid) and
// verifies with a set of public keys keyed by kid — accepting both the current
// and previous keys to support zero-downtime key rotation. Refresh tokens are
// whitelisted in Redis so logout/ban takes effect immediately.
type TokenManager struct {
signKey *rsa.PrivateKey
signKID string
verifyKeys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey // kid -> public key (current + old)
accessTTL time.Duration
refreshTTL time.Duration
rdb *redis.Client
now func() time.Time
}
// TokenConfig configures a TokenManager.
type TokenConfig struct {
// SignKey is the active RSA private key used to sign new tokens.
SignKey *rsa.PrivateKey
// SignKID is the key id written into the JWT header.
SignKID string
// VerifyKeys maps kid -> public key. Must contain SignKID; may contain
// additional (older) keys still accepted during rotation. If nil, the
// public part of SignKey under SignKID is used.
VerifyKeys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey
AccessTTL time.Duration
RefreshTTL time.Duration
// Now is an optional clock override for tests.
Now func() time.Time
}
// NewTokenManager constructs a TokenManager, validating the key material.
func NewTokenManager(rdb *redis.Client, cfg TokenConfig) (*TokenManager, error) {
if cfg.SignKey == nil {
return nil, errors.New("auth: token manager requires a signing key")
}
if cfg.SignKID == "" {
return nil, errors.New("auth: token manager requires a signing key id (kid)")
}
verify := cfg.VerifyKeys
if verify == nil {
verify = map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{}
}
if _, ok := verify[cfg.SignKID]; !ok {
verify[cfg.SignKID] = &cfg.SignKey.PublicKey
}
accessTTL := cfg.AccessTTL
if accessTTL <= 0 {
accessTTL = DefaultAccessTTL
}
refreshTTL := cfg.RefreshTTL
if refreshTTL <= 0 {
refreshTTL = DefaultRefreshTTL
}
now := cfg.Now
if now == nil {
now = time.Now
}
return &TokenManager{
signKey: cfg.SignKey,
signKID: cfg.SignKID,
verifyKeys: verify,
accessTTL: accessTTL,
refreshTTL: refreshTTL,
rdb: rdb,
now: now,
}, nil
}
// IssueWithJTI mints a fresh access+refresh pair, whitelists the refresh JTI in
// Redis, and returns that JTI so the caller can bind a session to the refresh
// token. Issue wraps this when the JTI isn't needed.
func (tm *TokenManager) IssueWithJTI(ctx context.Context, userID int64, userUUID string) (*TokenPair, string, error) {
now := tm.now()
access, _, err := tm.sign(userID, userUUID, typAccess, tm.accessTTL, now)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
refresh, refreshJTI, err := tm.sign(userID, userUUID, typRefresh, tm.refreshTTL, now)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
if err := tm.whitelist(ctx, refreshJTI, userID); err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
return &TokenPair{
AccessToken: access,
RefreshToken: refresh,
ExpiresIn: int(tm.accessTTL.Seconds()),
}, refreshJTI, nil
}
// Issue mints a fresh access+refresh pair (refresh JTI discarded).
func (tm *TokenManager) Issue(ctx context.Context, userID int64, userUUID string) (*TokenPair, error) {
pair, _, err := tm.IssueWithJTI(ctx, userID, userUUID)
return pair, err
}
// sign builds and signs one token, returning the compact string and its JTI.
func (tm *TokenManager) sign(userID int64, userUUID, typ string, ttl time.Duration, now time.Time) (string, string, error) {
jti := uuid.NewString()
claims := Claims{
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
Subject: userUUID,
ID: jti,
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now.Add(ttl)),
},
UID: userID,
Typ: typ,
}
tok := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodRS256, claims)
tok.Header["kid"] = tm.signKID
signed, err := tok.SignedString(tm.signKey)
if err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("auth: sign token: %w", err)
}
return signed, jti, nil
}
// keyfunc resolves the verification key from the token's kid header and rejects
// any algorithm other than RS256.
func (tm *TokenManager) keyfunc(t *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
if _, ok := t.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodRSA); !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("auth: unexpected signing method %q", t.Header["alg"])
}
kid, _ := t.Header["kid"].(string)
if kid == "" {
return nil, errors.New("auth: token missing kid")
}
pub, ok := tm.verifyKeys[kid]
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("auth: unknown kid %q", kid)
}
return pub, nil
}
// parse validates signature, expiry, and the expected token type. Expiry is
// checked manually against tm.now so tests can inject a clock without mutating
// the package-global jwt.TimeFunc.
func (tm *TokenManager) parse(tokenStr, wantTyp string) (*Claims, error) {
claims := &Claims{}
parser := jwt.NewParser(
jwt.WithValidMethods([]string{"RS256"}),
jwt.WithoutClaimsValidation(), // we validate exp/iat ourselves below
)
if _, err := parser.ParseWithClaims(tokenStr, claims, tm.keyfunc); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
now := tm.now()
if claims.ExpiresAt == nil || now.After(claims.ExpiresAt.Time) {
return nil, errors.New("auth: token expired")
}
if claims.IssuedAt != nil && now.Add(time.Minute).Before(claims.IssuedAt.Time) {
return nil, errors.New("auth: token used before issued")
}
if claims.Typ != wantTyp {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("auth: token type %q, want %q", claims.Typ, wantTyp)
}
return claims, nil
}
// ParseAccess validates an access token and returns its claims.
func (tm *TokenManager) ParseAccess(tokenStr string) (*Claims, error) {
return tm.parse(tokenStr, typAccess)
}
// RefreshWithJTI validates+rotates a refresh token (single-use) and returns the
// old and new refresh JTIs so the caller can move the bound session. Refresh
// wraps this when the JTIs aren't needed.
func (tm *TokenManager) RefreshWithJTI(ctx context.Context, refreshToken string) (pair *TokenPair, oldJTI, newJTI string, err error) {
claims, err := tm.parse(refreshToken, typRefresh)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", "", err
}
// Whitelist check + single-use rotation: DEL returns the number of keys
// removed; 0 means the JTI was absent (already rotated, logged out, or
// banned) → reject.
removed, err := tm.rdb.Del(ctx, refreshKeyPrefix+claims.ID).Result()
if err != nil {
return nil, "", "", fmt.Errorf("auth: refresh whitelist del: %w", err)
}
if removed == 0 {
return nil, "", "", ErrInvalidTokenSentinel
}
pair, newJTI, err = tm.IssueWithJTI(ctx, claims.UID, claims.Subject)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", "", err
}
return pair, claims.ID, newJTI, nil
}
// Refresh validates+rotates a refresh token (JTIs discarded).
func (tm *TokenManager) Refresh(ctx context.Context, refreshToken string) (*TokenPair, error) {
pair, _, _, err := tm.RefreshWithJTI(ctx, refreshToken)
return pair, err
}
// Revoke removes a single refresh JTI from the whitelist (logout).
func (tm *TokenManager) Revoke(ctx context.Context, jti string) error {
return tm.rdb.Del(ctx, refreshKeyPrefix+jti).Err()
}
// ParseRefreshJTI returns a refresh token's JTI (for session lookup on logout).
func (tm *TokenManager) ParseRefreshJTI(refreshToken string) (string, error) {
claims, err := tm.parse(refreshToken, typRefresh)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return claims.ID, nil
}
// RevokeRefresh parses a refresh token and revokes its JTI. Used by logout.
// Returns an error only when the token is structurally invalid; a missing or
// already-rotated JTI is a no-op (logout is idempotent).
func (tm *TokenManager) RevokeRefresh(ctx context.Context, refreshToken string) error {
claims, err := tm.parse(refreshToken, typRefresh)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return tm.Revoke(ctx, claims.ID)
}
// whitelist stores the refresh JTI with the refresh TTL.
func (tm *TokenManager) whitelist(ctx context.Context, jti string, userID int64) error {
if err := tm.rdb.Set(ctx, refreshKeyPrefix+jti, userID, tm.refreshTTL).Err(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("auth: refresh whitelist set: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// ErrInvalidTokenSentinel is returned by Refresh when the token is structurally
// valid but no longer whitelisted. Callers map it to ErrInvalidToken.
var ErrInvalidTokenSentinel = errors.New("auth: refresh token not in whitelist")
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
// PEM loading helpers (used by wiring/config to build a TokenManager)
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
// LoadPrivateKeyPEM parses a PEM-encoded RSA private key (PKCS#1 or PKCS#8).
func LoadPrivateKeyPEM(pemBytes []byte) (*rsa.PrivateKey, error) {
block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes)
if block == nil {
return nil, errors.New("auth: no PEM block in private key")
}
if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes); err == nil {
return key, nil
}
parsed, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("auth: parse private key: %w", err)
}
rsaKey, ok := parsed.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("auth: private key is not RSA")
}
return rsaKey, nil
}
// LoadPublicKeyPEM parses a PEM-encoded RSA public key (PKIX or PKCS#1).
func LoadPublicKeyPEM(pemBytes []byte) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes)
if block == nil {
return nil, errors.New("auth: no PEM block in public key")
}
if pub, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(block.Bytes); err == nil {
if rsaPub, ok := pub.(*rsa.PublicKey); ok {
return rsaPub, nil
}
return nil, errors.New("auth: public key is not RSA")
}
rsaPub, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PublicKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("auth: parse public key: %w", err)
}
return rsaPub, nil
}