6e99e32285
实现「一个二进制三个监听」中的管理端:
- 独立监听 ADMIN_LISTEN(默认 127.0.0.1:9443,FromEnv 拒绝 0.0.0.0/:: 等公网绑定)
- 中间件链:mw_ipallow(CIDR 白名单,仅信任 RemoteAddr,默认内网段)→
mw_session(HttpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Strict cookie,Redis 30min 滑动 TTL)
- 登录双因素:argon2id 密码 + RFC6238 TOTP;失败限流与临时锁定;
TOTP 密钥 AES-GCM 加密入库;migration 000008 增补 admins 表;
首个管理员由 cmd/adminctl create 创建(终端输出 otpauth URI/Secret)
- 功能三块(html/template + embed 静态资源,原生 JS 二次确认):
1. 码批次:表单生成→明文仅在本次 CSV 下载出现(不落盘/不入日志);
批次列表 + 整批作废(复用 #3 codes,新增 Store.ListBatches/VoidBatch)
2. 节点操作:列表 + 近期 node_events;replace 经 #14 ProvisionService、
draining/up 经 #5 Lifecycle(二者未就绪→注入 stub,UI 置灰);二次确认 + CSRF
3. audit_log 查看:actor/action/target/时间范围过滤分页;同页查 node_events
- 所有写操作写 audit_log(actor=用户名,meta 不含明文);管理端仅记安全事件
(登录失败/锁定/白名单拦截),不记常规访问日志
- internal/totp 复用包(与 doc/05 用户中心 2FA 同算法,纯标准库)
测试:totp RFC6238 向量、argon2/AES 往返、白名单放行/拦截、会话滑动过期、
登录成功/密码错/TOTP 错/未知用户/锁定、批次 CSV 含明文且 audit 不泄露、
作废/节点操作的二次确认与 CSRF 缺失被拒、mock 断言 service 调用参数、审计过滤。
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
127 lines
3.7 KiB
Go
127 lines
3.7 KiB
Go
package admin
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import (
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"crypto/aes"
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"crypto/cipher"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"encoding/base64"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/argon2"
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)
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// Argon2id parameters. These follow OWASP's "second" recommended profile
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// (64 MiB, 1 iteration, parallelism 4) — strong yet fast enough for an
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// interactive admin login.
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const (
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argonMemory = 64 * 1024 // KiB
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argonTime = 1
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argonParallelism = 4
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argonSaltLen = 16
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argonKeyLen = 32
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)
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var b64 = base64.RawStdEncoding
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// HashPassword hashes a plaintext password with argon2id and returns a PHC
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// formatted string: $argon2id$v=19$m=...,t=...,p=...$<salt>$<hash>.
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func HashPassword(password string) (string, error) {
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salt := make([]byte, argonSaltLen)
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if _, err := rand.Read(salt); err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("admin.HashPassword: %w", err)
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}
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key := argon2.IDKey([]byte(password), salt, argonTime, argonMemory, argonParallelism, argonKeyLen)
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return fmt.Sprintf("$argon2id$v=%d$m=%d,t=%d,p=%d$%s$%s",
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argon2.Version, argonMemory, argonTime, argonParallelism,
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b64.EncodeToString(salt), b64.EncodeToString(key)), nil
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}
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// VerifyPassword reports whether password matches the given PHC-encoded
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// argon2id hash, in constant time.
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func VerifyPassword(encoded, password string) bool {
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params, salt, want, err := decodePHC(encoded)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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got := argon2.IDKey([]byte(password), salt, params.t, params.m, params.p, uint32(len(want)))
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return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(got, want) == 1
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}
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type argonParams struct {
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m uint32
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t uint32
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p uint8
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}
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func decodePHC(encoded string) (argonParams, []byte, []byte, error) {
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parts := strings.Split(encoded, "$")
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// ["", "argon2id", "v=19", "m=..,t=..,p=..", salt, hash]
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if len(parts) != 6 || parts[1] != "argon2id" {
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return argonParams{}, nil, nil, errors.New("admin: malformed argon2 hash")
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}
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var version int
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if _, err := fmt.Sscanf(parts[2], "v=%d", &version); err != nil {
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return argonParams{}, nil, nil, errors.New("admin: bad argon2 version")
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}
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var pr argonParams
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if _, err := fmt.Sscanf(parts[3], "m=%d,t=%d,p=%d", &pr.m, &pr.t, &pr.p); err != nil {
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return argonParams{}, nil, nil, errors.New("admin: bad argon2 params")
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}
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salt, err := b64.DecodeString(parts[4])
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if err != nil {
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return argonParams{}, nil, nil, errors.New("admin: bad argon2 salt")
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}
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hash, err := b64.DecodeString(parts[5])
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if err != nil {
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return argonParams{}, nil, nil, errors.New("admin: bad argon2 hash")
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}
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return pr, salt, hash, nil
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}
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// EncryptSecret seals plaintext with AES-256-GCM under key (32 bytes). The
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// returned blob is nonce || ciphertext, suitable for storing in a VARBINARY
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// column. Used to keep TOTP secrets encrypted at rest.
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func EncryptSecret(key []byte, plaintext string) ([]byte, error) {
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gcm, err := newGCM(key)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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nonce := make([]byte, gcm.NonceSize())
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if _, err := rand.Read(nonce); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("admin.EncryptSecret nonce: %w", err)
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}
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return gcm.Seal(nonce, nonce, []byte(plaintext), nil), nil
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}
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// DecryptSecret reverses EncryptSecret.
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func DecryptSecret(key, blob []byte) (string, error) {
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gcm, err := newGCM(key)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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ns := gcm.NonceSize()
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if len(blob) < ns {
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return "", errors.New("admin.DecryptSecret: ciphertext too short")
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}
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nonce, ct := blob[:ns], blob[ns:]
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pt, err := gcm.Open(nil, nonce, ct, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("admin.DecryptSecret: %w", err)
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}
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return string(pt), nil
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}
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func newGCM(key []byte) (cipher.AEAD, error) {
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if len(key) != 32 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("admin: secret key must be 32 bytes, got %d", len(key))
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}
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block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("admin: aes cipher: %w", err)
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}
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return cipher.NewGCM(block)
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}
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