wangjia
f03d2dc8a6
与控制面同仓同 go.mod，新增节点 agent 实现：
- proto/agent/v1/agent.proto + internal/pb/agentv1：冻结的控制面↔agent gRPC 契约
（Enroll/Register/Heartbeat/Subscribe/Ack/ReportUsage）。仓库尚无 protoc 流水线，
暂以手写 Go 类型 + JSON gRPC codec 实现，与 proto 1:1 对应，待 protoc 接入即可替换。
- internal/agentd：
- enroll.go：首启生成 EC 密钥+CSR，持 bootstrap token 调 Enroll 换 90d 节点证书
（CN=node_uuid），落 /etc/pangolin-agent/，此后 mTLS。
- conn.go(agent.go)+creds.go：mTLS 主动拨号 + 指数退避重连；重连携带 last_command_id；
Register 取 ConfigSnapshot 全量配置覆盖本地。
- heartbeat.go：30s 上报 peer/带宽/CPU + config_version；need_full_resync→全量同步。
- command.go：消费 Subscribe，Upsert/Revoke/Rotate/ApplyConfig/Lifecycle 幂等处理后
Ack（at-least-once，按 command_id 去重）。
- singbox.go+render.go：内存用户表 + 落盘 state.json（仅 dp_uuid+expires_at）；任何变更
渲染完整 sing-box 配置（REALITY users[uuid,flow] + Hy2 users[派生口令]）→ 500ms 去抖
合并 → systemd 重启。
- ttl.go：凭证 TTL 定时移除并上报。
- usage.go：按 dp_uuid 聚合上报，绝无 user_id/email/目的地址。
- derive.go：Hy2 口令 = HMAC-SHA256(key, dp_uuid)，与控制面同源派生。
- cmd/agent：入口（flag/env 配置）。
- infra/cloud-init/{node.yaml.tmpl,install-node.sh,README.md}：一段式安装，下载锁定版本
二进制并校验 SHA-256，systemd 拉管，首启即 Enroll/Register。shellcheck -S warning 通过。
测试（bufconn mock 控制面，无需 docker）：Enroll→Register→Heartbeat 全流转；Upsert/Revoke
渲染正确；Rotate 宽限期新旧并存到点移除；TTL 自动移除并上报；断流重连 last_command_id
续发不丢不重；need_full_resync 触发重注册；state.json 恢复；去抖合并；扫描确认无身份字段。
go test -race ./internal/agentd/... ./internal/pb/... 通过；go vet ./... 通过。
落实 doc/04 §2 节点无状态化与 doc/06 §3 数据面红线（节点仅见 dp_uuid）。
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
35 lines
1.5 KiB
Go
35 lines
1.5 KiB
Go
package agentd
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import (
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/base64"
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)
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// DeriveHy2Password derives a node-agnostic Hysteria2 password from the opaque
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// data-plane credential id (dp_uuid). The REALITY inbound uses dp_uuid directly as
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// the VLESS user uuid; the Hy2 inbound cannot reuse a UUID as a password verbatim
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// (it must look like an opaque secret), so it is derived from the SAME source —
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// "password = dp_uuid 同源派生" — via a keyed HMAC.
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//
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// The derivation is deterministic given (dp_uuid, key): the control plane runs the
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// exact same function when it builds the client's connect config (doc/02 §3.1), so
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// both sides agree without the password ever crossing the agent contract.
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//
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// Risk note (carried from task #5): the derivation key is shared material. If a
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// node is seized the attacker still only sees dp_uuids and this node's key, which
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// lets them recompute Hy2 passwords for dp_uuids THEY ALREADY HOLD — it does not
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// reveal other subscribers' credentials or any account identity. Rotating the key
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// rotates every Hy2 password. When key == "" the password falls back to the raw
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// dp_uuid (acceptable for dev; production cloud-init always injects a key).
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func DeriveHy2Password(dpUUID, key string) string {
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if key == "" {
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return dpUUID
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}
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mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(key))
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mac.Write([]byte(dpUUID))
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sum := mac.Sum(nil)
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// base64url without padding → URL/JSON-safe, 43 chars.
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return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sum)
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}
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