Files
pangolin/infra/cloud-init/node.yaml.tmpl
T
wangjia 3d5bac66b4 feat(provision): 弹性节点基建 Terraform + 一键更换 (tsk_6u0FxmbC7Yeq)
IaC 面 (infra/) 与控制面 (server/internal/provision) 双产出,落地 doc/04 §4
「节点是牲口」弹性拓扑与 make-before-break 一键更换。

server/internal/provision:
- CloudAdapter 适配层 + Registry(首发 vultr 消耗品池 / hetzner 精品池各一);
  厂商凭证仅从 PROVISION_<VENDOR>_* env 注入,不入库不入 git。
- ProvisionService:CreateNode(幂等键重放不重复开机)、DestroyNode(幂等)、
  RotateIP(换 IP 不换机 + version bump)、ListProviders。
- Replace 一键更换:先建后拆,新机 up 先于旧机 draining(容量不下降),
  replacement_uuid 幂等键 + replacements 表分步记录,崩溃可续跑不重复。
- RotatePool:池内滚动轮换,并发度 1–2。
- cmd/nodectl CLI:create/destroy/rotate-ip/replace/rotate-pool/providers。
- 单测(mock 厂商 API + 内存 Store):幂等重放、make-before-break 时序断言、
  开机失败/探活超时→destroyed+失败计数+告警钩子、崩溃续跑、RotatePool。

infra/:
- terraform/:探针机 + 控制面基线模块化(probe / control-plane)+ README,
  低频基线进 state,节点不进 Terraform。
- cloud-init/node.yaml.tmpl:节点引导模板(注入一次性 bootstrap token,task #5)。
- identity-isolation.md:身份隔离登记表(doc/06 §2 红线,无任何凭证)。

migrations/000008:nodes 增 provider_instance_id/elastic_ip_id、node_events
增 ip_rotated、provision_idempotency / replacements 表(附加式,不动现网)。

红线:仅面向新厂商池,绝不纳管现网生产 EC2(deploy/ marzban)。

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-13 14:23:39 +08:00

65 lines
2.7 KiB
Cheetah

## template: jinja-free Go text/template — rendered by
## server/internal/provision (CloudInitRenderer). Fields:
## {{.NodeUUID}} {{.BootstrapToken}} {{.Region}} {{.Role}} {{.Tier}} {{.ControlPlaneURL}}
##
## "Nodes are cattle, not pets" (doc/04 §2): this is the ENTIRE persistent
## footprint of a data-plane node — sing-box + agent binaries + a one-time
## bootstrap token. Zero user DB, zero logs, zero persistent state.
##
## SECURITY: the rendered output carries a one-time bootstrap token. It MUST NOT
## be logged. The token is consumed exactly once during mTLS enrollment (task #5)
## and is useless afterwards.
#cloud-config
write_files:
# Node identity + enrollment parameters consumed by the agent on first boot.
- path: /etc/pangolin/bootstrap.env
permissions: "0600"
owner: root:root
content: |
PANGOLIN_NODE_UUID={{.NodeUUID}}
PANGOLIN_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN={{.BootstrapToken}}
PANGOLIN_CONTROL_PLANE_URL={{.ControlPlaneURL}}
PANGOLIN_REGION={{.Region}}
PANGOLIN_ROLE={{.Role}}
PANGOLIN_TIER={{.Tier}}
# systemd unit: agent enrolls (mTLS) then pulls runtime config from control plane.
- path: /etc/systemd/system/pangolin-agent.service
permissions: "0644"
owner: root:root
content: |
[Unit]
Description=Pangolin node agent (self-register + config pull)
After=network-online.target
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=simple
EnvironmentFile=/etc/pangolin/bootstrap.env
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/pangolin-agent run
# No-log node: agent does not persist connection logs.
Restart=always
RestartSec=5
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
runcmd:
# 1. Harden: key-only SSH, no root password (doc/06 §3).
- sed -i 's/^#\?PermitRootLogin.*/PermitRootLogin prohibit-password/' /etc/ssh/sshd_config
- sed -i 's/^#\?PasswordAuthentication.*/PasswordAuthentication no/' /etc/ssh/sshd_config
- systemctl restart sshd || true
# 2. Install the agent binary (pinned, checksum-verified by the install script,
# delivered out-of-band by task #6). Placeholder URL resolved at build time.
- install -d -m 0755 /etc/pangolin
- /usr/local/bin/pangolin-agent-install || true
# 3. Enroll + start. The agent reads bootstrap.env, performs mTLS enrollment,
# and the control plane flips the node provisioning → probing → up.
- systemctl daemon-reload
- systemctl enable --now pangolin-agent.service
# 4. Shred the one-time token from disk after enrollment (defence in depth).
- bash -c 'sleep 60; shred -u /etc/pangolin/bootstrap.env 2>/dev/null || rm -f /etc/pangolin/bootstrap.env'
# No swap file written to disk, no persistent data dirs — a destroyed node leaks nothing.