Files
pangolin/server/internal/auth/token_test.go
T
wangjia a5e25b444f feat(auth): 验证码/注册/登录/JWT 鉴权模块 (tsk_2PFfyviECIXh)
实现 server/internal/auth 控制面鉴权底座,对应 doc/02 §4.1、doc/06 §3:

- POST /v1/auth/code:IP+邮箱双维度 Redis 滑窗限频(同邮箱 1/min、同 IP 10/h)
  + 一次性邮箱域黑名单(embed 词表)→ 6 位数字码写 auth:code:{email} TTL 10min
  → 异步发信(SMTP / 开发态 log mailer)。
- POST /v1/auth/register:验码(一次性,删 key;超次数烧码)→ 单事务建号
  (uuid + dp_uuid 应用层生成、argon2id)+ 7 天 PRO 试用(source='trial')→ 签发 JWT。
- POST /v1/auth/login:argon2id 校验(失败恒定时、未知用户走 dummy hash);
  失败计数限流 rl:login:{email} + 锁定;banned 拒绝。
- POST /v1/auth/refresh:RS256,access 15min + refresh 30d 落 Redis 白名单
  jwt:refresh:{jti},旋转时删旧写新;JWT 头带 kid,验证端接受新旧公钥支持轮换。
- RequireAuth 中间件:解析 Bearer access,注入 user id(复用 codes.CtxKeyUserID
  避免循环依赖)+ uuid + claims 到 context。
- 错误体统一走 internal/apierr 的 {code, message_zh, message_en},文案双语脱敏。
- 文件拆分:handler/service/password/token/ratelimit/emailcheck/store/mailer/
  middleware/errors/keyloader;config 增加可选 JWT PEM 路径/kid 加载。

测试:password/token/ratelimit/emailcheck/service/handler/middleware 单测
(miniredis,含注册全流程、重复邮箱 409、验证码错误/过期/复用/烧码、限频 429
带 Retry-After、登录失败锁定、banned 拒绝、refresh 旋转后旧 token 失效),
go test -race 通过;集成测试 integration_test.go(testcontainers MySQL8+Redis,
register→login→refresh→受保护接口全链路,构建 tag integration)与 codes 模块同构。

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-13 12:19:10 +08:00

128 lines
3.3 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"context"
"crypto/rsa"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestToken_IssueAndParseAccess(t *testing.T) {
rdb, _ := newMiniRedis(t)
tm := newTokenManager(t, rdb, time.Now)
pair, err := tm.Issue(context.Background(), 42, "uuid-42")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Issue: %v", err)
}
if pair.ExpiresIn != 900 {
t.Errorf("ExpiresIn = %d, want 900", pair.ExpiresIn)
}
claims, err := tm.ParseAccess(pair.AccessToken)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseAccess: %v", err)
}
if claims.UID != 42 || claims.Subject != "uuid-42" {
t.Errorf("claims = %+v", claims)
}
if claims.Typ != typAccess {
t.Errorf("typ = %q", claims.Typ)
}
}
func TestToken_RefreshCannotBeUsedAsAccess(t *testing.T) {
rdb, _ := newMiniRedis(t)
tm := newTokenManager(t, rdb, time.Now)
pair, _ := tm.Issue(context.Background(), 1, "u1")
if _, err := tm.ParseAccess(pair.RefreshToken); err == nil {
t.Fatal("refresh token must not parse as access")
}
}
func TestToken_AccessExpiry(t *testing.T) {
rdb, _ := newMiniRedis(t)
base := time.Now()
clock := base
tm := newTokenManager(t, rdb, func() time.Time { return clock })
pair, _ := tm.Issue(context.Background(), 1, "u1")
clock = base.Add(16 * time.Minute) // past 15-min access TTL
if _, err := tm.ParseAccess(pair.AccessToken); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected expired access token to fail")
}
}
func TestToken_RefreshRotationInvalidatesOld(t *testing.T) {
rdb, _ := newMiniRedis(t)
tm := newTokenManager(t, rdb, time.Now)
ctx := context.Background()
pair, _ := tm.Issue(ctx, 7, "u7")
rotated, err := tm.Refresh(ctx, pair.RefreshToken)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Refresh: %v", err)
}
if rotated.RefreshToken == pair.RefreshToken {
t.Fatal("rotation should produce a new refresh token")
}
// Old refresh token is now invalid.
if _, err := tm.Refresh(ctx, pair.RefreshToken); err == nil {
t.Fatal("old refresh token must be rejected after rotation")
}
// New refresh token still works.
if _, err := tm.Refresh(ctx, rotated.RefreshToken); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new refresh token should work: %v", err)
}
}
func TestToken_RevokeRefresh(t *testing.T) {
rdb, _ := newMiniRedis(t)
tm := newTokenManager(t, rdb, time.Now)
ctx := context.Background()
pair, _ := tm.Issue(ctx, 3, "u3")
claims, err := tm.parse(pair.RefreshToken, typRefresh)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse refresh: %v", err)
}
if err := tm.Revoke(ctx, claims.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Revoke: %v", err)
}
if _, err := tm.Refresh(ctx, pair.RefreshToken); err == nil {
t.Fatal("revoked refresh token must be rejected")
}
}
func TestToken_KeyRotationAcceptsOldKey(t *testing.T) {
rdb, _ := newMiniRedis(t)
// Old manager signs with k1.
oldKey := newRSAKey(t)
oldTM, err := NewTokenManager(rdb, TokenConfig{SignKey: oldKey, SignKID: "k1"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
pair, _ := oldTM.Issue(context.Background(), 9, "u9")
// New manager signs with k2 but still accepts k1 for verification.
newKey := newRSAKey(t)
newTM, err := NewTokenManager(rdb, TokenConfig{
SignKey: newKey,
SignKID: "k2",
VerifyKeys: map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{
"k1": &oldKey.PublicKey,
"k2": &newKey.PublicKey,
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := newTM.ParseAccess(pair.AccessToken); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("token signed with old key must still verify: %v", err)
}
}