wangjia
6e99e32285
实现「一个二进制三个监听」中的管理端：
- 独立监听 ADMIN_LISTEN（默认 127.0.0.1:9443，FromEnv 拒绝 0.0.0.0/:: 等公网绑定）
- 中间件链：mw_ipallow（CIDR 白名单，仅信任 RemoteAddr，默认内网段）→
mw_session（HttpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Strict cookie，Redis 30min 滑动 TTL）
- 登录双因素：argon2id 密码 + RFC6238 TOTP；失败限流与临时锁定；
TOTP 密钥 AES-GCM 加密入库；migration 000008 增补 admins 表；
首个管理员由 cmd/adminctl create 创建（终端输出 otpauth URI/Secret）
- 功能三块（html/template + embed 静态资源，原生 JS 二次确认）：
1. 码批次：表单生成→明文仅在本次 CSV 下载出现（不落盘/不入日志）；
批次列表 + 整批作废（复用 #3 codes，新增 Store.ListBatches/VoidBatch）
2. 节点操作：列表 + 近期 node_events；replace 经 #14 ProvisionService、
draining/up 经 #5 Lifecycle（二者未就绪→注入 stub，UI 置灰）；二次确认 + CSRF
3. audit_log 查看：actor/action/target/时间范围过滤分页；同页查 node_events
- 所有写操作写 audit_log（actor=用户名，meta 不含明文）；管理端仅记安全事件
（登录失败/锁定/白名单拦截），不记常规访问日志
- internal/totp 复用包（与 doc/05 用户中心 2FA 同算法，纯标准库）
测试：totp RFC6238 向量、argon2/AES 往返、白名单放行/拦截、会话滑动过期、
登录成功/密码错/TOTP 错/未知用户/锁定、批次 CSV 含明文且 audit 不泄露、
作废/节点操作的二次确认与 CSRF 缺失被拒、mock 断言 service 调用参数、审计过滤。
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
61 lines
1.6 KiB
Go
61 lines
1.6 KiB
Go
package admin
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import (
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"net"
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"net/http"
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)
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// IPAllow is middleware that rejects any request whose source IP is not within
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// the configured allowlist. It is the first line of defence in front of the
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// admin backend (doc/06 §2: 管理后台不得暴露公网).
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//
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// The source address is taken from the TCP peer (RemoteAddr) ONLY. Proxy
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// headers like X-Forwarded-For are intentionally ignored: the admin port is
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// reached directly over an SSH tunnel / intranet, so trusting client-supplied
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// headers would let an attacker spoof the allowlist.
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type IPAllow struct {
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allow []*net.IPNet
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sec *SecurityLog
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next http.Handler
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}
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// NewIPAllow wraps next with the allowlist check.
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func NewIPAllow(allow []*net.IPNet, sec *SecurityLog, next http.Handler) *IPAllow {
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return &IPAllow{allow: allow, sec: sec, next: next}
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}
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func (m *IPAllow) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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ip := clientIP(r.RemoteAddr)
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if ip == nil || !m.allowed(ip) {
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if m.sec != nil {
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m.sec.IPBlocked(r.Context(), hostOnly(r.RemoteAddr), r.URL.Path)
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}
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http.Error(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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m.next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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}
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func (m *IPAllow) allowed(ip net.IP) bool {
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for _, n := range m.allow {
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if n.Contains(ip) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// clientIP extracts the net.IP from a "host:port" RemoteAddr.
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func clientIP(remoteAddr string) net.IP {
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return net.ParseIP(hostOnly(remoteAddr))
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}
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func hostOnly(remoteAddr string) string {
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host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(remoteAddr)
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if err != nil {
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// RemoteAddr may already be a bare host in some test setups.
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return remoteAddr
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}
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return host
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}
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