Files
pangolin/pay/internal/wallet/derive_test.go
wangjia 4393edf1d7 feat(pay): pangolin-pay 钱包派生模块(#34/34A · 加密货币交易引擎 Phase B.2)
新建独立 Go module pay/(pangolin-pay:独立 VPS 跑,与控制面分开、隔离 crypto 依赖)。
wallet 包:
- AddressFromAccountXpub(xpub, change, index):watch-only 从账户 xpub 派生 TRON 地址
  (Keccak-256 legacy → 后20字节 → 0x41 → base58check),watcher 用,不碰私钥。
- seed.go(离线专用):助记词→account xpub / 地址私钥(hex),给 Phase A 导 xpub、Phase D 归集签名。
- 测试:①派生一致性——xpub 路径与私钥路径逐个相等(证明每个收款地址对得上签名私钥);
  ②金标准向量锁定实现防回归。⚠️ 金标准需按 A.4 用 Ian Coleman 交叉核对一次。

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 02:50:24 +08:00

100 lines
3.6 KiB
Go

package wallet
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
// testMnemonic is the canonical all-zero-entropy BIP39 test vector. The derived
// TRON addresses logged by TestAccountXpubDeriveConsistency must match
// iancoleman.io/bip39 (Coin = TRX, BIP44) — that manual comparison is Phase A.4
// of the crypto-tx-engine plan (guards against a derivation mismatch that would
// silently send funds to addresses we don't control).
const testMnemonic = "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon about"
// TestAccountXpubDeriveConsistency proves the watcher's watch-only path
// (xpub -> address) yields exactly the same address as the offline private path
// (seed -> privkey -> pubkey -> address) for each index. That equality is what
// guarantees every receiving address the watcher hands out is spendable by the
// key we hold in cold storage.
func TestAccountXpubDeriveConsistency(t *testing.T) {
xpub, err := AccountXpubFromMnemonic(testMnemonic, "", 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("account xpub: %v", err)
}
t.Logf("account xpub (m/44'/195'/0'): %s", xpub)
acct, err := AccountKeyFromMnemonic(testMnemonic, "", 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("account key: %v", err)
}
for i := uint32(0); i < 5; i++ {
viaXpub, err := AddressFromAccountXpub(xpub, 0, i) // what the watcher does
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("via xpub [%d]: %v", i, err)
}
ck, err := acct.Derive(0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("derive change: %v", err)
}
ak, err := ck.Derive(i)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("derive index %d: %v", i, err)
}
pub, err := ak.ECPubKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ec pubkey: %v", err)
}
viaPriv := PubKeyToTronAddress(pub.SerializeUncompressed())
if viaXpub != viaPriv {
t.Fatalf("index %d: xpub-derived %q != priv-derived %q", i, viaXpub, viaPriv)
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(viaXpub, "T") || len(viaXpub) != 34 {
t.Fatalf("index %d: not a valid TRON address: %q", i, viaXpub)
}
t.Logf("m/44'/195'/0'/0/%d -> %s", i, viaXpub)
}
}
// TestKnownVector locks the derivation to a golden result (filled from the run of
// TestAccountXpubDeriveConsistency, then confirmed against iancoleman.io — A.4).
// If this ever changes, the derivation implementation regressed.
func TestKnownVector(t *testing.T) {
if len(goldenAddrs) == 0 {
t.Skip("golden vector not yet baked — run TestAccountXpubDeriveConsistency, confirm vs Ian Coleman, then fill goldenAddrs")
}
xpub, err := AccountXpubFromMnemonic(testMnemonic, "", 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("xpub: %v", err)
}
if goldenXpub != "" && xpub != goldenXpub {
t.Fatalf("account xpub changed:\n got %s\n want %s", xpub, goldenXpub)
}
for i, want := range goldenAddrs {
got, err := AddressFromAccountXpub(xpub, 0, uint32(i))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("addr[%d]: %v", i, err)
}
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("addr[%d]: got %s want %s", i, got, want)
}
}
}
// Golden vector for the "abandon…about" test mnemonic, Coin=TRX, m/44'/195'/0'.
// Locks the derivation against regression. ⚠️ MUST be confirmed once against
// iancoleman.io/bip39 (Phase A.4) — self-consistency (TestAccountXpubDeriveConsistency)
// proves the xpub and private paths agree, but only an independent tool proves
// both aren't wrong the same way. If Ian Coleman disagrees, the impl has a bug.
var (
goldenXpub = "xpub6D1AabNHCupeiLM65ZR9UStMhJ1vCpyV4XbZdyhMZBiJXALQtmn9p42VTQckoHVn8WNqS7dqnJokZHAHcHGoaQgmv8D45oNUKx6DZMNZBCd"
goldenAddrs = []string{
"TUEZSdKsoDHQMeZwihtdoBiN46zxhGWYdH", // m/44'/195'/0'/0/0
"TSeJkUh4Qv67VNFwY8LaAxERygNdy6NQZK", // m/44'/195'/0'/0/1
"TYJPRrdB5APNeRs4R7fYZSwW3TcrTKw2gx", // m/44'/195'/0'/0/2
}
)