wangjia
6e99e32285
实现「一个二进制三个监听」中的管理端：
- 独立监听 ADMIN_LISTEN（默认 127.0.0.1:9443，FromEnv 拒绝 0.0.0.0/:: 等公网绑定）
- 中间件链：mw_ipallow（CIDR 白名单，仅信任 RemoteAddr，默认内网段）→
mw_session（HttpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Strict cookie，Redis 30min 滑动 TTL）
- 登录双因素：argon2id 密码 + RFC6238 TOTP；失败限流与临时锁定；
TOTP 密钥 AES-GCM 加密入库；migration 000008 增补 admins 表；
首个管理员由 cmd/adminctl create 创建（终端输出 otpauth URI/Secret）
- 功能三块（html/template + embed 静态资源，原生 JS 二次确认）：
1. 码批次：表单生成→明文仅在本次 CSV 下载出现（不落盘/不入日志）；
批次列表 + 整批作废（复用 #3 codes，新增 Store.ListBatches/VoidBatch）
2. 节点操作：列表 + 近期 node_events；replace 经 #14 ProvisionService、
draining/up 经 #5 Lifecycle（二者未就绪→注入 stub，UI 置灰）；二次确认 + CSRF
3. audit_log 查看：actor/action/target/时间范围过滤分页；同页查 node_events
- 所有写操作写 audit_log（actor=用户名，meta 不含明文）；管理端仅记安全事件
（登录失败/锁定/白名单拦截），不记常规访问日志
- internal/totp 复用包（与 doc/05 用户中心 2FA 同算法，纯标准库）
测试：totp RFC6238 向量、argon2/AES 往返、白名单放行/拦截、会话滑动过期、
登录成功/密码错/TOTP 错/未知用户/锁定、批次 CSV 含明文且 audit 不泄露、
作废/节点操作的二次确认与 CSRF 缺失被拒、mock 断言 service 调用参数、审计过滤。
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
75 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
75 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
package admin
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"log"
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)
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// SecurityLog records admin-side security events (login failures, allowlist
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// rejections, lockouts) to both the structured logger and the audit_log table.
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//
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// Per doc/02 §1 the admin backend records ONLY security events — never routine
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// access logs.
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type SecurityLog struct {
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store Store
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logger *log.Logger
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}
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// NewSecurityLog creates a SecurityLog. A nil logger falls back to the
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// standard logger.
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func NewSecurityLog(store Store, logger *log.Logger) *SecurityLog {
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if logger == nil {
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logger = log.Default()
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}
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return &SecurityLog{store: store, logger: logger}
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}
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func (s *SecurityLog) write(ctx context.Context, actor, action, target string, meta map[string]any) {
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if s == nil {
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return
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}
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metaJSON := ""
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if meta != nil {
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if b, err := json.Marshal(meta); err == nil {
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metaJSON = string(b)
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}
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}
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s.logger.Printf("admin security event action=%s actor=%s target=%s", action, actor, target)
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if s.store != nil {
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if err := s.store.WriteAudit(ctx, actor, action, target, metaJSON); err != nil {
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s.logger.Printf("admin security event audit write failed: %v", err)
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}
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}
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}
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// LoginFail records a failed login attempt.
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func (s *SecurityLog) LoginFail(ctx context.Context, username, ip, reason string) {
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s.write(ctx, safeActor(username), "admin_login_fail", "ip:"+ip, map[string]any{"reason": reason})
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}
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// LoginLocked records a login attempt against a locked-out account.
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func (s *SecurityLog) LoginLocked(ctx context.Context, username, ip string) {
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s.write(ctx, safeActor(username), "admin_login_locked", "ip:"+ip, nil)
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}
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// LoginOK records a successful login.
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func (s *SecurityLog) LoginOK(ctx context.Context, username, ip string) {
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s.write(ctx, safeActor(username), "admin_login_ok", "ip:"+ip, nil)
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}
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// IPBlocked records an allowlist rejection.
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func (s *SecurityLog) IPBlocked(ctx context.Context, ip, path string) {
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s.write(ctx, "-", "admin_ip_blocked", "ip:"+ip, map[string]any{"path": path})
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}
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func safeActor(username string) string {
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if username == "" {
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return "-"
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}
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if len(username) > 64 {
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return username[:64]
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}
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return username
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}
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