docs: 客户端可配置分流设计+原型(并入 v2 作开发基线) #7

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wangjia wants to merge 39 commits from design/configurable-proxy into feat/pay-v2-integration
3 changed files with 64 additions and 1 deletions
Showing only changes of commit f819a77d83 - Show all commits
+1 -1
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@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) LoginSubmit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
username := strings.TrimSpace(r.PostFormValue("username"))
password := r.PostFormValue("password")
code := strings.TrimSpace(r.PostFormValue("totp"))
ip := hostOnly(r.RemoteAddr)
ip := realIP(r) // 经本机 caddy 反代时取 XFF 末跳,否则 TCP 对端(见 mw_ipallow.go)
sid, _, err := h.auth.Login(r.Context(), username, password, code, ip)
if err != nil {
+26
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@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package admin
import (
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
)
// IPAllow is middleware that rejects any request whose source IP is not within
@@ -58,3 +59,28 @@ func hostOnly(remoteAddr string) string {
}
return host
}
// realIP returns the client IP for **audit logging** (admin_login_ok 等)。
//
// 与上面 IPAllow 的取址原则刻意不同:白名单闸继续只看 TCP 对端(不可伪造);
// 而审计日志要的是"人从哪来"——经本机反代(caddy mTLS 网关在同机回环上反代
// 127.0.0.1:9444)时 RemoteAddr 恒为 loopback,没有溯源价值。仅当 TCP 对端是
// loopback(即请求确实来自本机可信反代)才信 X-Forwarded-For,且取**最后一跳**
// (Caddy 把真实 TCP 对端追加在末位;更早的段可被客户端伪造预置,不可信)。
func realIP(r *http.Request) string {
peer := hostOnly(r.RemoteAddr)
ip := net.ParseIP(peer)
if ip == nil || !ip.IsLoopback() {
return peer
}
xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For")
if xff == "" {
return peer
}
parts := strings.Split(xff, ",")
last := strings.TrimSpace(parts[len(parts)-1])
if net.ParseIP(last) == nil {
return peer
}
return last
}
+37
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@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
package admin
import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
)
// realIP:仅当 TCP 对端为 loopback(本机可信反代,如 caddy mTLS 网关)时才信
// X-Forwarded-For 的最后一跳;其余情况一律用 TCP 对端,防止伪造头污染审计。
func TestRealIP(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
remoteAddr string
xff string
want string
}{
{"直连无代理", "203.0.113.7:52011", "", "203.0.113.7"},
{"直连时伪造 XFF 不可信", "203.0.113.7:52011", "1.2.3.4", "203.0.113.7"},
{"经本机反代取 XFF 最后一跳", "127.0.0.1:38200", "198.51.100.23", "198.51.100.23"},
{"多跳取最后一跳(前段可伪造)", "127.0.0.1:38200", "6.6.6.6, 198.51.100.23", "198.51.100.23"},
{"本机反代但无 XFF 回退 loopback", "127.0.0.1:38200", "", "127.0.0.1"},
{"XFF 非法值回退", "127.0.0.1:38200", "not-an-ip", "127.0.0.1"},
{"IPv6 loopback 反代", "[::1]:38200", "198.51.100.23", "198.51.100.23"},
}
for _, c := range cases {
t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
r := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/login", nil)
r.RemoteAddr = c.remoteAddr
if c.xff != "" {
r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", c.xff)
}
if got := realIP(r); got != c.want {
t.Errorf("realIP(remote=%s, xff=%q) = %q, want %q", c.remoteAddr, c.xff, got, c.want)
}
})
}
}