diff --git a/server/internal/admin/handlers.go b/server/internal/admin/handlers.go
index 278c783..fc5ea30 100644
--- a/server/internal/admin/handlers.go
+++ b/server/internal/admin/handlers.go
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) LoginSubmit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	username := strings.TrimSpace(r.PostFormValue("username"))
 	password := r.PostFormValue("password")
 	code := strings.TrimSpace(r.PostFormValue("totp"))
-	ip := hostOnly(r.RemoteAddr)
+	ip := realIP(r) // 经本机 caddy 反代时取 XFF 末跳,否则 TCP 对端(见 mw_ipallow.go)
 
 	sid, _, err := h.auth.Login(r.Context(), username, password, code, ip)
 	if err != nil {
diff --git a/server/internal/admin/mw_ipallow.go b/server/internal/admin/mw_ipallow.go
index be974d6..8a0c920 100644
--- a/server/internal/admin/mw_ipallow.go
+++ b/server/internal/admin/mw_ipallow.go
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package admin
 import (
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
+	"strings"
 )
 
 // IPAllow is middleware that rejects any request whose source IP is not within
@@ -58,3 +59,28 @@ func hostOnly(remoteAddr string) string {
 	}
 	return host
 }
+
+// realIP returns the client IP for **audit logging** (admin_login_ok 等)。
+//
+// 与上面 IPAllow 的取址原则刻意不同:白名单闸继续只看 TCP 对端(不可伪造);
+// 而审计日志要的是"人从哪来"——经本机反代(caddy mTLS 网关在同机回环上反代
+// 127.0.0.1:9444)时 RemoteAddr 恒为 loopback,没有溯源价值。仅当 TCP 对端是
+// loopback(即请求确实来自本机可信反代)才信 X-Forwarded-For,且取**最后一跳**
+// (Caddy 把真实 TCP 对端追加在末位;更早的段可被客户端伪造预置,不可信)。
+func realIP(r *http.Request) string {
+	peer := hostOnly(r.RemoteAddr)
+	ip := net.ParseIP(peer)
+	if ip == nil || !ip.IsLoopback() {
+		return peer
+	}
+	xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For")
+	if xff == "" {
+		return peer
+	}
+	parts := strings.Split(xff, ",")
+	last := strings.TrimSpace(parts[len(parts)-1])
+	if net.ParseIP(last) == nil {
+		return peer
+	}
+	return last
+}
diff --git a/server/internal/admin/realip_test.go b/server/internal/admin/realip_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc6a51e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/server/internal/admin/realip_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+package admin
+
+import (
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// realIP:仅当 TCP 对端为 loopback(本机可信反代,如 caddy mTLS 网关)时才信
+// X-Forwarded-For 的最后一跳;其余情况一律用 TCP 对端,防止伪造头污染审计。
+func TestRealIP(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name       string
+		remoteAddr string
+		xff        string
+		want       string
+	}{
+		{"直连无代理", "203.0.113.7:52011", "", "203.0.113.7"},
+		{"直连时伪造 XFF 不可信", "203.0.113.7:52011", "1.2.3.4", "203.0.113.7"},
+		{"经本机反代取 XFF 最后一跳", "127.0.0.1:38200", "198.51.100.23", "198.51.100.23"},
+		{"多跳取最后一跳(前段可伪造)", "127.0.0.1:38200", "6.6.6.6, 198.51.100.23", "198.51.100.23"},
+		{"本机反代但无 XFF 回退 loopback", "127.0.0.1:38200", "", "127.0.0.1"},
+		{"XFF 非法值回退", "127.0.0.1:38200", "not-an-ip", "127.0.0.1"},
+		{"IPv6 loopback 反代", "[::1]:38200", "198.51.100.23", "198.51.100.23"},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			r := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/login", nil)
+			r.RemoteAddr = c.remoteAddr
+			if c.xff != "" {
+				r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", c.xff)
+			}
+			if got := realIP(r); got != c.want {
+				t.Errorf("realIP(remote=%s, xff=%q) = %q, want %q", c.remoteAddr, c.xff, got, c.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}