# Identity isolation register (doc/06 §2 红线)

> **RED LINE (any phase, never crossed):** servers, domains, CDN, object
> storage, payment, email and phone numbers MUST NOT share any linkable identity.
> Each vendor uses an **independent account + independent email + crypto
> payment**. This file is the authoritative register of which isolated identity
> backs which asset. **It contains NO secrets** — only the isolation mapping.
> Credentials live in independent secret stores (env / files), never here, never
> in the database, never in git.

## How to use this register

1. Onboarding a new vendor/asset → add a row before provisioning anything.
2. Each row gets a distinct `identity-id` (an opaque internal label, e.g.
   `id-a7`). Never reuse an identity across rows.
3. Record the asset, pool, payment rail, and the **secret location** (where the
   credential is injected from), not the credential itself.

## Data-plane vendor pools (doc/04 §5.2)

Consumed by `server/internal/provision`. The `providers` table stores only
`name/api_kind/regions/pool/enabled`; the matching credential is injected from
the secret location below as `PROVISION_<VENDOR>_*`.

| identity-id | asset | pool | api_kind | payment | secret location (env) | notes |
|-------------|-------|------|----------|---------|-----------------------|-------|
| id-c1 | _vendor A_ | consumable | `vultr` | USDT/crypto | `PROVISION_VULTR_API_KEY` | small/cheap entry pool; ≥3 vendors target |
| id-c2 | _vendor B_ | consumable | _tbd_ | crypto | `PROVISION_<B>_API_KEY` | second consumable vendor |
| id-c3 | _vendor C_ | consumable | _tbd_ | crypto | `PROVISION_<C>_API_KEY` | third consumable vendor |
| id-p1 | _vendor D_ | premium | `hetzner` | crypto | `PROVISION_HETZNER_API_TOKEN` | stable exit/pro entry; native IPs |

> Consumable pool and premium pool MUST use **different vendor accounts** so a
> mass-burn of the consumable pool never touches the premium pool (doc/04 §4.2).

## Management / baseline (Terraform)

Managed by `infra/terraform`. Independent from all data-plane vendor identities.

| identity-id | asset | purpose | payment | secret location |
|-------------|-------|---------|---------|-----------------|
| id-m1 | mgmt/probe cloud | probe machines + control-plane host | crypto | `TF_VAR_hcloud_token` (CI secret) |
| id-m2 | control-plane DB/Redis | user DB, audit_log | — | server deploy secrets |

## Adjacent assets (registered elsewhere, listed for completeness)

| identity-id | asset | owner doc |
|-------------|-------|-----------|
| id-d1 | domain registrar (WHOIS privacy) | doc/05 |
| id-d2 | CDN account | doc/05 |
| id-pay1 | payment / card store (USDT-TRC20) | doc/02 §4 |
| id-tg1 | ops TG bot (anonymous) | doc/04 §5.3 |

## Audit checklist (run before each onboarding)

- [ ] New identity-id is unique; no email/account reused from another row.
- [ ] Payment is crypto / non-KYC; not bound to a real-name account.
- [ ] Credential stored only in its secret location; absent from git & DB.
- [ ] `ci/scan-redline.sh` and a repo/DB secret scan pass.
